Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Scholarly Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2013

Drugs, Dignity and Danger: Human Dignity as a Constitutional
Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael
Washington and Lee University School of Law, buchhandlerraphaelm@wlu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and
the Human Rights Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Buchhandler-Raphael, Michal, "Drugs, Dignity and Danger: Human Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to
Limit Overcriminalization" (2013). Scholarly Articles. 529.
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/529

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington and Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized
administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact christensena@wlu.edu.

DRUGS, DIGNITY, AND DANGER:
HUMAN DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINT TO LIMIT OVERCRIMINALIZATION
MICHAL BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL*
The American criminal justice system is increasingly collapsing under
its own heavy weight and, thus, requires inevitable change. One notable
feature responsible for this broken system is overcriminalization—the scope
of criminal law is constantly expanding, imposing criminal sanctions on a
growing range of behaviors. One area where overcriminalization is most
notable concerns victimless crimes, namely, those where individual adults
engage in conduct that inflicts only harm to self or to other consenting
adults, but not on third parties. These victimless crimes include prostitution,
pornography, sadomasochism, gambling, and most notably, drug crimes.
Despite increasing scholarly critique of the continued criminalization of
these behaviors—particularly drug offenses—significant limits on the scope
of victimless crimes have not yet been adopted. Two features characterizing
criminal law account for this: first, in contrast with criminal procedure,
constitutional law has not placed any significant limits on substantive
criminal law, and second, there is no coherent theory of criminalization that
sets clear boundaries between criminal and non-criminal behaviors.
This Article proposes a constitutional constraint to limit criminalization
of victimless crimes and, particularly, to alleviate the pressures on the
criminal justice system emanating from its continuous “war on drugs.” To
accomplish this goal, the Article explores the concept of human dignity, a
fundamental right yet to be invoked in the context of substantive criminal
law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence invokes conflicting accounts
of human dignity: liberty as dignity, on the one hand, and communitarian
virtue as dignity, on the other. However, the Court has not yet developed a
workable mechanism to reconcile these competing concepts in cases where
they directly clash. This Article proposes guidelines for balancing these
contrasting interests and then applies them to drug crimes, illustrating that
adopting such guidelines would result in constraining the scope of
substantive criminal law.

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law; LL.B,
Hebrew University, cum laude (1995); LL.M, Hebrew University (1999); LL.M, University
of Virginia School of Law (2007); S.J.D., University of Virginia School of Law (2010). I
would like to thank Eric Luna, for brainstorming with me about this Article’s main themes. I
would also like to thank the editors of the Tennessee Law Review for their excellent editing,
diligent work, and invaluable contributions to this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
The American criminal justice system is under tremendous pressures. It
is increasingly collapsing under its own heavy weight, thus calling for a
thorough re-evaluation.1 The system’s illnesses encompass various aspects
of the criminal process, including failings in both criminal procedure and
substantive criminal law.2 Indeed, perhaps the feature most responsible for
this broken system is what scholars have dubbed “the overcriminalization
phenomenon,”3 in which a growing number of adult individuals are liable to
conviction for an ever wider range of behaviors.4
In criticizing the criminal justice system in its current form, scholars
have mainly focused on procedure, process, and sentencing policies, giving
less attention to criminal law theory and substantive criminal law. In
contrast with criminal procedure, which is thoroughly constitutionalized,
constitutional law places no constraints on substantive criminal law. 5
Despite occasional calls to adopt constitutional limitations on substantive
criminal law, scholarly proposals have had no practical effect, as courts
have failed to develop significant constitutional doctrines for checking
legislatures’ criminalization choices.6
However, the broken criminal justice system is in tension with one of
the fundamental principles of American constitutional jurisprudence,
namely, constitutional protection of individual liberties and freedom from
government intrusion into the private lives of individuals.7 The stringent
criminal process, with its substantive and procedural shortcomings, carries
tremendous power to jeopardize basic principles of liberty and justice for
all defendants. Unfortunately, the current criminal justice system falls short
of satisfying these constitutional commitments.
Another notable feature of substantive criminal law is the lack of a
coherent theory of criminalization.8 Scholars have acknowledged that, at the
1

. See Erik Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law, in GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING, 1, 1-4 (Gene Healy ed., 2004); William J.
Stuntz, Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001).
2
. See Luna, supra note 1, at 1-4; Stuntz, supra note 1, at 507.
3
. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005); Eric Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005).
4
. See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(2007).
5
. See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1270-71 (1998).
6
. See generally Markus D. Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and
Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 517 (2003-2004) (stating that constitutional scrutiny has
yet to be applied to substantive criminal law).
7
. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
8.
See HUSAK, supra note 4, at 3-55.

293

2012]

BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL

294

theoretical level, criminal law is inconsistent, lacking clear conceptual
boundaries to criminalization. 9 Scholars have further argued that
legislatures do not abide by a consistent set of principles regarding what
matters are appropriate for criminalization, employing the criminal law
purely as a tool for achieving whatever end majorities choose to pursue.10
Furthermore, until recently, relatively little scholarship has addressed
the use of substantive criminal law as a means to limit the scope of the
criminal justice system. Moreover, criminal law theorists have offered little
to address the problem of overcriminalization from a theoretical
perspective, leaving legislatures and courts with too few sources to rely
upon.11
Recognizing the scope and implications of overcriminalization,
scholars have recently ventured into the area of criminal law theory,
proposing both internal and external sets of constraints to limit the scope of
criminal law. 12 This Article builds on this scholarship and links the
emerging U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning human dignity to
the myriad of constitutional constraints that would limit the scope of
substantive criminal law by offering a workable mechanism to remedy
some of the problems associated with overcriminalization.
Indeed, one area where overcriminalization is most notable concerns
“vice or morals crimes.” These offenses generally fall into two categories:
first, individuals who engage in conduct which may inflict harm on
themselves, but not on third parties, such as recreational drug use or
gambling; and second, mutually consensual conducts between two or more
adults that may inflict harm on one or more of these participants. Examples
of the latter include consensual sexual activities such as prostitution and
sadomasochism. While arguably, defendants who inflict harm on other
adults while engaging in consensual behaviors should be able to raise the
defense of consent when charged with a crime involving the infliction of
serious physical harm, the law generally denies this defense except for in
very limited circumstances.13
This Article questions the justifications for the continued
criminalization of behaviors that either inflict only harm to self but not to
others or inflict harm on other consenting adults (hereinafter “victimless

9

. See Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 971,
972 (2010).
10
. Id.
11
. Id.
12
. See HUSAK, supra note 4.
13
. Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 174-75 (2007) (discussing the general rule that consent is typically
not a defense when serious bodily injury occurs, except in very limited exceptions such as
sport contests and medical procedures).
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crimes”).14 More specifically, it examines when and to what extent these
arguably victimless crimes warrant the government’s intervention through
criminal regulation.
The traditional justification for criminalizing conduct that is essentially
victimless has strongly relied upon the state’s need to enforce morality, a
position most commonly associated with the famous Hart-Devlin debate.15
However, legal moralism as a justification for criminalization was explicitly
rejected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v.
Texas, which struck down as unconstitutional Texas’s sodomy law. 16
Lawrence ostensibly adopted the Millian harm principle, standing for the
proposition that a state is not justified in criminalizing a conduct unless it
inflicts harm upon others. 17 In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia
predicted that the decision would lead to the invalidation of “[s]tate laws
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity”18 and ultimately result in a
“massive disruption of the current social order.”19 He further suggested that
even laws criminalizing heroin use are suspect under the holding.20 But
Scalia’s dire warnings have not materialized: Lawrence is not viewed as a
criminal law opinion, thus failing to affect any substantive changes in
criminal law in general and in the context of victimless crimes in particular.
Various victimless crimes are still intact and the harm principle has not
been able to limit their scope. 21 Moreover, Lawrence stands for the
proposition that in the area of sexual behaviors implicating privacy,
autonomy, and liberty concerns, the state cannot criminalize such conduct
unless it can establish that harm to others has occurred. 22 However,
Lawrence has not been expanded to include limitations on the
criminalization of other consensual conduct outside the realm of sexual
behavior, including drug use, which affects other aspects of individuals’
autonomous choices.

14
. It is worth mentioning that crimes may be considered “victimless” only when
competent adults are involved. The discussion in this Article is therefore strictly limited to
the context of competent adults.
15
. See Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151, 1154-62
(2010-11).
16
. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003).
17
. Bergelson, supra note 13, at 184 n.187 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
(1859), reprinted in THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW 518 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993)).
18
. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590.
19
. Id. at 591.
20
. Id. at 590-92.
21
. See Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41 (2011).
22
. Id. at 101.
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This Article’s main purpose is to propose a constitutional constraint
that will limit criminalization of victimless crimes and, more particularly,
alleviate the increasing pressures on the criminal justice system emanating
from the system’s continuous “war on drugs.” To accomplish this goal, the
Article turns to the concept of human dignity, a fundamental right, which
has not yet been invoked as a mechanism to constrain overcriminalization.
Human dignity has been a recurrent theme in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence. 23 While under international law, human
dignity is a specific right, 24 it is not an enumerated right in the U.S.
Constitution, but rather viewed as a fundamental value, underlying other
constitutional rights.25 While in recent years the Court has invoked human
dignity in a growing number of constitutional cases,26 it has done so in
strikingly different ways, illustrating that there is no single approach to the
concept of human dignity.27
One concept of human dignity invoked by the Court implicates a liberal
theory, which rests on the deontological principles of freedom and
autonomy (hereinafter “liberty as dignity”). 28 This concept is best
articulated in the Supreme Court decisions in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey29 and Lawrence v. Texas,30 suggesting
that in the Fourteenth Amendment, the government protects “choices
central to personal dignity . . . (such as) the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe and of the mystery of
human life.” 31 This account suggests that the government may not
criminalize any conduct that interferes with “choices central to personal
23

. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2012) (stating that although prisoners
forfeit their fundamental right to liberty, they retain their right to human dignity); Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002) (stating that cruel and unusual punishment of prisoner was
“antithetical to human dignity”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (stating that
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that punishment in the penal
context comport with the “fundamental human dignity that the Amendment protects”).
24
. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. I, Dec. 7,
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 9 (stating that “[h]uman dignity is inviolable. It must be respected
and protected.”).
25
. See, e.g., William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47 (Michael J. Meyer &
William A. Parent eds., 1992); Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 127-28 (2012).
26
. See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 183, 207-17 (2011).
27
. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169,
189-90 (2011).
28
. Id. at 190.
29
. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
30
. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
31
. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861.
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dignity.”32 A key inquiry after Lawrence is: what types of choices are
central to personal dignity, and, in particular, whether these choices extend
beyond the realm of procreation and sexual preferences to encompass
additional forms of personal choices, such as the right to harm oneself.
A contrasting concept of dignity invoked by the Court embodies the
notion of communitarian or collective virtue as dignity (hereinafter:i.e.,
“communitarian virtue”).33 Under this account, human dignity requires the
adoption of societal fundamental rights, ethics, and values that every
civilized society must adhere to. This account rests on a virtue ethics
theory, which rejects a rights-based approach, suggesting instead that the
purpose of law is to make people and society virtuous, rather than to
promote individual rights.34 Adopting this theory also requires the state to
criminalize consensual activities that do not harm others in order to protect
collective human dignity.
The Court, however, has never resolved the tensions between these
contrasting accounts. A few scholars have proposed using human dignity as
a constitutional constraint to limit the scope of criminal law.35 However,
this proposal relies solely on the concept of liberty as dignity, while
disregarding the contrasting account of human dignity as communitarian
virtue, which the Court has emphasized in recent opinions. While scholars
have noted that human dignity is multifaceted, they have neither proposed a
test that would determine which account of human dignity prevails in cases
where two concepts clash, nor elaborated on the circumstances under which
one concept of human dignity outweighs the other. Furthermore, while the
Court has invoked human dignity in the context of constitutional law, it has
not yet extended this concept to substantive criminal law.36
This Article’s goal is to apply the concept of human dignity in the
criminal law context to limit the scope of criminalization of victimless
crimes in general, and drug offenses in particular. Acknowledging that the
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence invokes conflicting concepts of human
dignity, this Article attempts to reconcile the competing concepts of human
dignity in specific categories of cases by introducing a balancing test, which
would weigh individuals’ interests in retaining their right to liberty as
dignity against the interests of a virtuous society to preserve individuals’
right to dignity under a communitarian virtue account.
The criminal regulation of drugs offers a potent test case to apply the
proposed theory, as drug crimes are the most notable example of victimless
crimes. The criminalization of all forms of recreational drugs and the
“tough on crime” policy adopted by American criminal law towards drug
32

.
.
34
.
35
.
36
.
33

Id.
Henry, supra note 27, at 189-90.
Id.
See Dubber, supra note 6, at 515-16.
See Bergelson, supra note 13, at 218-20.
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crimes take up a significant amount of the nation’s limited resources and
dominate the criminal justice system. Therefore, this Article focuses mainly
on drug prohibitions by applying the proposed rules to draw distinctions
between types of drug crimes.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines previous attempts to
limit overcriminalization, in general, and victimless crimes, in particular. It
demonstrates that the harm principle has not offered a sufficient substantive
constraint to limit the scope of criminal law, and that constitutional law has
not placed any external limitations on substantive criminal law. Considering
the empirical failure of the harm principle and its normative inability to
foster substantive limits on the criminalization of victimless crimes, this
section concludes that the concept of human dignity might offer an
alternative means to accomplish that goal.
Part II lays out the conceptual framework for using human dignity as a
constitutional constraint on the state’s power to criminalize victimless
crimes. It examines the current U.S. Supreme Court’s multifaceted human
dignity jurisprudence in light of the theoretical understandings of this
concept. Acknowledging that no single account of human dignity is
absolute, it proposes using a balancing test to determine which concept of
human dignity prevails in specific categories of cases.37 The crux of this test
involves weighing individuals’ liberty as dignity against a virtuous
society’s commitment to preserving communitarian virtue as a means of
protecting collective dignity.
Part III introduces guidelines for decriminalizing victimless crimes in
order to secure individuals’ rights to dignity, liberty, and autonomy, while
upholding the continued criminalization of activities that endanger
individuals’ fundamental right to life.
Part IV applies the proposed guidelines to drug crimes. The proposal
rests on distinguishing between two types of prohibitions—drug trafficking
and drug use, and “soft” and “hard” drugs—and applying the guidelines to
decriminalize use and possession of “soft” drugs while upholding criminal
prohibitions on use and possession of “hard” drugs and on trafficking in all
types of drugs.
I. ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT OVERCRIMINALIZATION
Criminal law scholars have vehemently criticized the continuous
expansion of substantive criminal law, warning against the costs and
burdens incurred by the criminal justice system, as well as against the
dangers this expansion poses to individual defendants.38 Scholars note that
37

. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV.
683, 685-86 (2007) (proposing a standard of review for considering the individual rights
approach to evaluating Second Amendment questions).
38
. See Luna, supra note 3, at 703-04; see also Beale, supra note 3, at 748-49.
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there are too many broadly-worded criminal statutes, which cover a wide
range of behaviors and do not justify the use of the coercive power of the
state through its extensive employment of criminal law.39 This problem is
particularly salient in three categories of crimes: offenses of risk prevention
or crimes of endangerment, such as drug crimes; ancillary offenses, which
function as surrogates for the prosecution of primary or core crimes
unlikely to result in prosecution; and overlapping crimes, namely,
recriminalizing the same crimes over and over again.40 As scholars have
already addressed the various aspects of overcriminalization,41 this Article
examines an alternative means to limit the size and scope of criminal law.
A comprehensive theory of criminalization, elaborating the substantive
requirements of any criminal statute, could be a natural candidate for
limiting the scope of substantive criminal law. However, a notable feature
of substantive criminal law is the lack of a comprehensive theory of
criminalization, in the absence of which legislatures are free to continue to
expand criminal law by enacting more offenses and criminalizing additional
types of behaviors. 42 Without a comprehensive theory, the necessary
components of new crimes are left undefined and the boundary between
criminal conduct and conduct that ought to remain beyond the scope of
criminalization are blurred.
A. The Harm Principle’s Empirical Failure
Following John Stuart Mill’s famous articulation of the “harm
principle,” many scholars posit that under contemporary jurisprudence,
harm to others is the key predicate for criminalization.43 The underlying
view of the harm principle is utilitarian in essence, measuring an action’s
social utility and overall societal advantages of criminalization against its
costs and unintended consequences.44 The judicial recognition of the harm
principle as the core justification for criminalization is best demonstrated in
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas.45 While
numerous different readings have been offered to Justice Kennedy’s
majority holding in Lawrence, the harm principle plays a crucial role in all
of them, as Lawrence has been read to stand for the proposition that the
harm principle is the key justification for criminalizing consensual conduct
39

See HUSAK, supra note 4, at 3-54.
Id. at 36-41.
41.
Id. at 41.
42
. See Brown, supra note 9, at 972; see also HUSAK, supra note 4, at 58 (stating that
until a comprehensive theory of substantive criminal law is developed, it will continue to
expand).
43
. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 116-17 (1987).
44
. Id. at 105-06.
45
. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40

.
.
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between adults. In other words, when adults engage in fully consensual
conduct in the privacy of their homes, the state is unjustified in
criminalizing such conduct.
However, the practical effects of endorsing the harm principle have
been limited, raising doubts concerning its actual ability to limit criminal
law, in general, and criminalization of victimless crimes, in particular.
Indeed, the harm principle’s failure to offer a comprehensive account for
criminalization is twofold: from an empirical perspective, it has not been
able to limit criminalization and has also resulted in expanding the scope of
criminal law;46 from a normative perspective, the harm principle is unable
to limit criminalization because it does not articulate the substantive content
of its normative component. However, little has been offered by scholars to
address these challenges, and the search for the missing component to
supplement the harm principle has not yet been successful.
While the Lawrence decision is typically viewed as a victory for those
who support the de-criminalization of consensual conducts and reject legal
moralism as a justification for criminalization, little attention has been
given to the practical ramifications of the harm principle as endorsed by the
decision.47 Despite what seemed to be a revolutionary holding, fueled by
Justice Scalia’s “parade of horribles” dissent and his slippery-slope style
warning that Lawrence signals the end of all morals statutes, Lawrence has
surprisingly not resulted in far-reaching practical implications on the scope
of criminal law. 48 While Lawrence is understood to be a landmark
constitutional law decision, its effects on both the criminal law and the
criminalization of victimless crimes have been rather modest.49
While the harm principle is deeply rooted in a libertarian view,
focusing on individuals’ rights to liberty, autonomy, and privacy, an
unintended consequence of the alleged “victory” of the harm principle has
been its excessive use to justify a broad range of criminal bans, resulting in
an illiberal criminal law.50 Today, the harm principle serves not only to
justify criminal regulation, but also to expand it—a surprising consequence
given that the harm principle was initially viewed as a mechanism to limit
46.

See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).
47
. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free
Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 503, 503-04 (2004) (characterizing the Lawrence Court’s adoption of the
harm principle as “the coup de grâce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged,
brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law
representations”).
48
. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49
. See Strader, supra note 21, at 95-97.
50
. See Steven D. Smith, Is The Harm Principle Illiberal?, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 14
(2006).
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criminal law by rejecting moral arguments that supported criminalization to
uphold morality per se.51 The expansive reading of the harm principle,
however, has resulted in turning an ostensibly liberal idea into a
conservative concept, which is too readily able to generate harm arguments
to justify expansive prohibitions that previously had only moralism
rationales.52 Scholars have concluded that “[t]he concept of ‘harm’ itself so
eludes definition that it has been employed to describe all manner of
conduct with no tangible or emotional injury, no victim, and no significant
risk creation.”53
B. Victimless Crimes After Lawrence v. Texas
Applying the harm principle in the context of victimless crimes further
sharpens its empirical failure, as the justifications for the continued
criminalization of victimless crimes appear dubious after Lawrence v.
Texas. Recall, that the category of victimless crimes includes not only
activities where individuals inflict only harm to themselves—such as
gambling and the use of recreational drugs—but also consensual activities
that take place between two or more adults, inflicting only harm to those
who engage in them but not on third parties—such as prostitution,
pornography, polygamy, incest, and sadomasochism.54
In theory, adopting the Millian harm principle should have resulted in
the decriminalization of all forms of victimless crimes. Under the Lawrence
rationale, when individuals are engaging in consensual activities, they
ought to enjoy a right to choose to engage in those activities, even if they
inflict harm upon themselves or upon other consenting participants. The
right to consent to harm, either self-inflicted or at the hands of other
participants, is grounded in the fundamental right to autonomy, liberty, and,
most importantly, human dignity. 55 A libertarian approach requires the
government to refrain from intervening in individuals’ free choices,
including choices that the government may view as harmful, injurious, or
simply “bad”.56 In addition, the government needs a specific justification to
restrict an individual’s right to choose to engage in activities that may harm
that individual in some way.57
51
. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Thinking Criminal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2419,
2421-22 (2007).
52
. Id.
53.
See Brown, supra note 9, at 971.
54
. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (8th ed. 1999).
55.
See Dubber, supra note 6, at 568. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values
and the Victim’s State of Mind, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 759, 770-71 (2000) (discussing different
aspects of the notion of dignity and its relation to the notion of autonomy).
56
. See Dubber, supra note 6, at 543.
57
. Id. at 536.
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However, the Court’s decision in Lawrence has not resulted in a
comprehensive overhaul of all victimless crimes, nor has it had much
practical effect on substantive criminal law.58 To name a few examples:
prostitution is still criminalized in all states (except several counties in
Nevada where legalized brothels are closely regulated);59 the laws in all
jurisdictions refuse to recognize consent as a defense to bodily injury;60
polygamy is still a criminal offense in all states; and while pornography is
heavily regulated but legal, the law still criminalizes obscenity, based on its
offensiveness to certain segments of society. 61 The continued
criminalization of these offenses sharpens the question of consent to harm:
if one individual authorizes another to inflict harm on him while engaging
in mutually consensual activities, such as sadomasochism practices, why
should the state intervene in these autonomous choices by criminalizing
these conducts?
Commentators have long grappled with the legal significance of
consent to harm and its precise role in criminal cases involving the
infliction of severe harm to others62: Vera Bergelson, for example, contends
that consent should always be at least a partial defense in cases involving
conducts which result in physical harm to another individual.63 However,
she also argues that consent alone does not suffice to justify bodily harm
and that to qualify as a full defense, the defendant must also establish that
the consensual harmful act either did not significantly set back the victim’s
interests or did not disregard the victim’s dignity.64
But not all victimless crimes involve the question of consent to harm,
since some vices consist of individuals inflicting harm only upon
themselves. Indeed, the most notable example concerning the continued
criminalization of victimless crimes is the use and possession of
recreational drugs. Recent years have seen a push in the direction of
58

. See generally Strader, supra note 21, at 42 (suggesting that “[d]espite Lawrence’s
purported landmark status and the vast amount of commentary that the decision has
produced, the case has had remarkably little impact on substantive criminal law as applied
by lower federal courts and state courts”).
59
. See Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep the Secrets from the Federal
Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 124 (2012).
60
. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2) (only allowing consent as a defense to
physical harm when the injury is not serious, when the injury is a reasonably foreseeable
result of “participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport,” and when “the
consent establishes justification for the conduct under Article 3 of the Code”).
61
. Strader, supra note 21, at 102-04.
62
. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 6, at 569; Paul Roberts, Philosophy, Feinberg,
Codification, and Consent: A Progress Report on English Experiences of Criminal Law
Reform, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 173, 252-53 (2001).
63
. See Bergelson, supra note 13, at 170.
64
. Id.
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decriminalizing both use and possession for self-use of marijuana.65 This
change has come about in the wake of several developments: first, Colorado
and Washington state have recently become the first states that legalized the
possession of up to one ounce of marijuana for adults twenty-one years and
older;66 second, many states now legalize the use of medical marijuana with
a doctor’s recommendation;67 third, in many jurisdictions, possession and
use of small quantities of marijuana is no longer a crime but rather a
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine;68 and lastly, many jurisdictions have
significantly relaxed their law enforcement practices concerning self-use
and possession of marijuana, making it the lowest enforcement priority.69
However, despite these winds of change, the federal government and
the majority of states still make possession of marijuana a criminal offense
punishable by imprisonment.70 Moreover, every year, federal and state drug
laws result in the arrest of more than 700,000 Americans for marijuana
possession alone.71 These statistics are particularly surprising in light of the
fact that more than 100 million Americans use marijuana, thus potentially
turning all of them into criminals.72
The continued criminalization of all types of drugs, including those
whose effects are scientifically proven to be similar to their legal
counterparts, alcohol and tobacco, is in direct conflict with the harm
principle.73 Furthermore, criminalizing possession and use of small amounts
of marijuana is not only unjustified under the utilitarian harm principle, but
also antithetical to fundamental libertarian values such as autonomy,
liberty, and privacy.74 This Article revisits this problem in Part IV, applying
a proposal to limit the overcriminalization of victimless crimes.

65

. Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Liberty Lost: The Moral Case for Marijuana Law
Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 279, 298 (2010).
66
. See Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions
Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15(describing the legal changes in Washington and
Colorado).
67
. See Ekow N. Yankah, A Paradox in Overcriminalization, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
1, 6 (2011) (describing medical marijuana reforms).
68
. Id. at 7-8 (discussing the growing trend in many jurisdictions towards
decriminalization of use and possession of marijuana).
69
. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 65, at 297-98.
70. Id. at 279.
71
. Id. at 280.
72
. Id. at 298.
73.
See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, No Rational Basis: The Pragmatic Case for
Marijuana Law Reform, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 43 (2009).
74
. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 65.
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C. The Harm Principle’s Normative Failure
The harm principle is unable to limit the scope of criminalization
because its definition lacks some essential normative components.75 Under
the harm principle, the main trend has been to demoralize criminal law both
in regard to criminalization and to punishment. 76 According to this
utilitarian view, crime is just one source of harm among many other
harmful activities, therefore diminishing the significance of the moral
component in crime and blurring the distinction between criminal law and
other areas of law.77 While the harm principle ostensibly ought to play an
important role in every criminalization decision in a post-Lawrence era,
criminal law theorists have long recognized that this principle, in itself, is
insufficient to justify criminal regulation.78 Furthermore, as harm arguments
become broader and more speculative, evaluating these claims, and
comparing between competing harms get more complicated.
Acknowledging the limits of the harm principle to provide a comprehensive
justification for criminalization, scholars concede that establishing the
perpetrator’s guilt and justifying his punishment requires the adoption of an
additional normative component, which stems from moral principles and
philosophical theories of rights and wrongdoing.79
Joel Feinberg offers one of the most comprehensive works on the limits
of the harm principle in his four volume series on justifications for
criminalization, contending that the harm principle consists of both a
setback to interests as well as establishing the perpetrator’s wrongdoing.80
However, a crucial question remains under Feinberg’s account: this theory
calls for supplementing the harm principle with a separate theory of rights,
namely, a theory that would provide substantive content to the wrongdoing
element.81 Moreover, prominent criminal law scholars concede that modern
criminal law is far from neutral and ought to encompass moral judgments
and fundamental societal values, both of which are common to all
societies.82 Furthermore, this normative moral dimension is not only an

75

. Id. at 281.
. Id. at 285.
77
. Id. at 284.
78
. Andrew Koppelman, Drug Policy and the Liberal Self, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 279,
281 (2006).
79
. See FEINBERG, supra note 43, at 118.
80
. See id.
81
. HUSAK, supra note 4, at 71.
82
. See generally Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory:
Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1105 (2011) (arguing that the
law depends on voluntary compliance, which is best attained by aligning law and popular
shared moral intuitions of ordinary people).
76
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inevitable component of any criminal law theory but also the distinctive
feature that separates criminal law from civil law.
Conceding that the harm principle in itself is unable to provide a
sufficient justification for criminalization, several scholars consider some
alternatives. Providing one example, Meir Dan-Cohen has proposed the
adoption of a rights-based perspective that departs from the harm principle
and focuses on human dignity as the key justification for criminalization.83
Dan-Cohen contends that the main and distinctive purpose of criminal law
is to uphold the equal moral worth of human beings.84 This type of proposal
responds to the claim that one of utilitarianism’s main flaws is its failure to
give adequate weight to the dignity of persons.85
Another proposal is offered by Michael Moore, who contends that the
harm principle is unable to explain why the criminal law punishes only
some omissions and harmless wrongdoing on one hand, but refuses to
punish harmful acts and other omissions that are not morally wrong on the
other. 86 The law punishes omissions because moral obligations require
individuals to help; harmless wrongdoing justifies punishment because
while nobody is actually harmed, the act is still morally wrong; and harmful
acts that are not wrongful do not justify punishment because there is simply
no culpable wrongdoing. 87 Rejecting the sole reliance on the harm
principle, Moore contends that the focus of justified criminal legislation
ought to be moral wrongdoing, not harms.88 Moore further argues that his
modified version of legal moralism as justification for criminalization is
compatible with liberal theories, in prohibiting the use of criminal law in
cases of moral paternalism.89
Douglas Husak advocates the adoption of the wrongdoing component
as one of the internal limitations on criminalization, in addition to other
constraints. These additional constraints include the nontrivial harm
requirement, the desert requirement—namely, that punishment is justified
only when and to the extent it is deserved—and the burden of proof
constraint, which holds that those who advocate the imposition of penal
sanctions should carry a heavy burden of proof of justifying them. 90
83

. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 51, at 2420 (suggesting that “the agenda of the
criminal law” be viewed “in terms of a Kantian morality focused on the core value of human
dignity”).
84
. Id.
85
. See Koppelman, supra note 78, at 281.
86
. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW
649 (2010).
87
. Id. at 753.
88
. Id. at 659, 669.
89
. Id. at 792-94.
90
. See HUSAK, supra note 4, at 55, 82-83, 92-100 (elaborating on the four internal
constraints that he identifies as limits on criminalization).

305

2012]

BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL

306

However, while Husak concedes that the wrongdoing component calls for
adopting a separate moral theory of rights, his work does not provide such a
supplemental theory, perhaps owing to the lack of consensus on what type
of theory ought to be adopted. 91 As a libertarian, Husak would have
advocated a theory focusing on individuals’ free choices, liberty, and
autonomy.92 However, with an extensive liberal theory having failed to
promote instrumental change in criminal law and many forms of activities
that interfere with individuals’ freedoms still criminalized, the wrongdoing
component is unable to constrain overcriminalization. Arguably, the
problem stems from the fact that scholars are unable to reach a consensus
concerning the precise definition and content of injuries and criminal
wrongdoing: while liberals focus on individual rights such as liberty and
autonomy as long as there is no harm to third parties, conservatives would
advocate a moral theory of rights that focuses on paternalistic justifications
favoring the protection of individuals from their own choices on the
grounds that they harm themselves.
D. The Unconstitutional Nature of Criminal Law
Another potential mechanism that could be used to constrain
overcriminalization is constitutional law: the doctrine of judicial review
authorizes the judiciary to review both state legislative enactments as well
as federal statutes, allowing federal judges to strike down legislation that is
incompatible with the U.S Constitution.93 However, while constitutional
law has successfully placed significant limits on criminal procedure, it has
not played a significant role in the realm of substantive criminal law,
leaving it almost completely beyond constitutional scrutiny.94
Commentators have long noted that substantive criminal law is not
constitutionalized, namely, that constitutional law places no constraints on
the content of substantive criminal law.95 In his landmark paper, William
Stuntz discusses three possible solutions to the problem of overcriminalization: limiting prosecutorial discretion, ending legislative
monopoly on crime definition, and constitutionalizing criminal law, which
he favors.96 While more than a decade has passed since the publication of
Stuntz’s work, courts have not developed significant constitutional
doctrines for checking legislatures’ crime creation choices, and the law has

91.
92

.

93.
94

.
.
96
.
95

Id. at 71.
Id.
See Dubber, supra note 6, at 530.
See Bilionis, supra note 5.
See, e.g., id. at 1271.
See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 579.
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still refused to take the path of constitutionalizing substantive criminal
law.97
In his recent book, 98 Douglas Husak proposes additional external
constraints to limit overcriminalization, drawing on an existing
constitutional doctrine of judicial review as a conceptual framework for
regulating substantive criminal law.99 Since the right not to be punished is
important but not fundamental, Husak’s theory adopts the doctrine of
intermediate scrutiny, under which a legislature could criminalize activity
only under three conditions: if the government interest in doing so is
substantial, the prohibition directly advances that government interest, and
the government's objective is no more extensive than necessary to achieve
its purpose.100
However, Husak concedes that, in the context of criminal law, courts
are not institutionally competent to make substantive judgments that the
doctrine itself requires, such as determining whether certain forms of
conduct warrant criminal condemnation, whether noncriminal approaches
are less restrictive than criminal laws, and whether particular statutes serve
important expressive functions. 101 Indeed, while at the theoretical level
these constraints on criminal law are coherent and plausible, at the practical
level they run into difficulties when substantive content is applied to them.
The following section draws on existing proposals to limit the scope of
substantive criminal law by turning to the concept of human dignity.
II. HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. Debating Human Dignity’s Jurisprudential Role
Human dignity is a unique concept in American jurisprudence; while it
is not an enumerated constitutional right, many courts and commentators
suggest that it is a fundamental value, underlying many other constitutional
rights. 102 Moreover, in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
increasingly invoked this concept in a wide array of its constitutional
decisions.103
While the notion of human dignity has received increasing judicial and
scholarly attention,104 American scholars sharply disagree over its role in
97.

See Brown, supra note 9.
HUSAK, supra note 4, at 55, 82-83.
99
. Id. at 128-32.
100.
Id. at 128, 132.
101
. Id. at 130-31.
102
. See Parent, supra note 25, at 47, 71.
103
. See Henry, supra note 27, at 171.
104
. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. L. REV.
1108, 1118 (2011).
98.
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American constitutional jurisprudence. 105 Various scholars focus on the
central role of human dignity within the constitutional jurisprudence of
fundamental rights, with several going so far as to hail it as one of the
fundamental constitutional values in American jurisprudence.106 Noting that
“human dignity . . . underlies our constitutional rights to privacy, liberty,
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, protection against cruel
and unusual punishment and other express rights and guarantees,” 107
scholars further stress that human dignity is one of “those very great
political values that define our constitutional morality.”108 Legal theorist
Ronald Dworkin offers perhaps the most far-reaching approach to the role
of human dignity in American jurisprudence, suggesting that “the principles
of human dignity . . . are embodied in the Constitution and are now
common ground in America.”109
However, while human dignity is a crucial component in many moral
theories, its precise meaning and application in American jurisprudence is
not always agreed upon.110 Christopher McCrudden, for example, is wary of
the term’s increasing popularity in constitutional discourse, strongly
criticizing the use of this concept in the context of American constitutional
law.111 McCrudden notes that what distinguishes this notion from similarly
elusive concepts in American jurisprudences—such as liberty—is the fact
that human dignity is not a part of the U.S. Constitution, raising doubts as
to whether it actually plays a significant role in American law or carries any
practical legal implications in American jurisprudence.112 Moreover, argues
McCrudden, as human dignity is susceptible to strikingly different readings,
it is unable to offer a workable legal standard and therefore should not be
applicable in legal decisions and constitutional jurisprudence.113
While human dignity is a murky theoretical concept, its increasing
invocation by the U.S Supreme Court suggests that it cannot be ignored.
Before turning to consider U.S. Supreme Court human dignity
jurisprudence, it is important to understand the philosophical theories
underlying the legal basis for human dignity.
105

See Henry, supra note 27, at 175.
See id.; Parent, supra note 25.
107.
See Maxine Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 753 (2006).
108
. See Parent, supra note 25, at 47, 71.
109
. See Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sep. 21,
2006), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/sep/21/three-questionsfor-america/.
110
. See Henry, supra note 27, at 172.
111
. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 712 (2008).
112
. See, e.g., id. at 695.
113.
See, e.g., id. at 706.
106

.
.
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B. Human Dignity in Philosophical Theories
Philosophical theories concerning normative ethics have traditionally
encompassed two competing traditions: deontology, which is based on the
individual’s moral rights and obligations, 114 and consequentialism (or
utilitarianism), which focuses on the consequences of actions and on
evaluating which actions most contribute to human happiness. 115
Deontology’s fundamental premise is that liberty, autonomy, and human
dignity are basic rights, whose restriction requires special justifications.116
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant is considered by many scholars to
be the founder of the modern concept of human dignity.117 According to
Kant, morality is based on a universal and impartial law of rationality, best
captured in his famous Categorical Imperative, demanding that a person
should “[a]ct in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but
always at the same time as an end.”118
Kant’s theory embodies the view that all human beings deserve to be
treated as free, autonomous agents because they have the distinct capacity
to adhere to moral reasoning and thought, which includes the ability to
make rational choices regarding what is deeply valuable or worthy.119 Kant
therefore contended that humanity, so far as it is capable of morality, is the
only thing which has dignity, and that this capacity provides every person
an intrinsic dignity that every other person must respect.120
114
. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (8th ed. 1999). See generally SHELLY KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 70-78 (1998) (discussing deontology’s basic tenets and noting that
deontology is a way of thinking about morality that speaks in terms of moral rights and
wrongs that are resistant to consequentialist considerations about what would produce the
best outcome).
115
. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (8th ed. 1999); see, e.g., Samuel Freeman,
Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 313, 323 (1994)
(noting that good consequences refer to social welfare as defined independently of any moral
concepts or principles).
116
. See Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV.
271, 292 (2006) (noting that “[a]pplying Kantian principles to political philosophy,
government should enact laws and policies that maximize individual autonomy and that
respect the inherent dignity of all people”).
117
. See, e.g., ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 215 (2008); Peter Branden Bayer,
Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution is a “Suicide Pact,” 20 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 287, 348-51 (2011); McCrudden, supra note 111, at 659.
118
. See Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals § 4:439, in
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 41, 88 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1785).
119
. See R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal
Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 274 (2002).
120
. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (James W.
Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785); see also WOOD, supra note 117, at
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According to Kant, autonomy is the basis for human dignity, and that
free will consists of the ability of humans to choose their goals or actions,
together with the capacity to distinguish good actions (respectful of others’
rights) from bad ones (disrespectful of others’ rights).121 Kant argues that
“the dignity of humanity consists…in the capacity to give universal law.”122
In other words, individuals’ human dignity derives from the capacity for
autonomous choices. Moreover, according to Kant, dignity is “absolute
inner worth,” unconditional and incomparable, because rational beings’
autonomy is unconditional, and therefore respect must be given to these
human beings unconditionally.123
The notion of human dignity entails both the right to demand dignity
and the state’s concomitant duty to respect an individual’s dignity.124 The
fundamental notion of autonomy therefore grounds both the dignity of
human beings and their obligations to respect the dignity of others.125 The
notions of respect and dignity are therefore the essence of the Kantian
approach: every human being both owes and is owed respect to others.126
Two of the most important American political and moral thinkers
follow Kantian views on autonomy and dignity, representing contemporary
views on human dignity under a deontological theory. John Rawls offers a
reinterpretation of Kant’s conception of personal autonomy and the
categorical imperative, suggesting that autonomy gives rise to obligations
of respect.127 In his “Principles of Justice,” Rawls describes the Liberty
Principle as establishing equal basic liberties for all citizens, such as
freedoms of conscience, association, and expression, as well as democratic
rights.128 These basic liberties have a special status and are prioritized over
other rights.129
Legal theorist Ronald Dworkin also embraces Kantian approaches,
suggesting that human dignity represents the ideology of both human rights
and liberal constitutionalism.130 Under this account, dignity and equality are
94.

121.

KANT, supra note 120, at 44-45; see also David G. Owen, Expectations in Tort, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1287, 1287 (2011).
122
. See Kant, supra note 118, § 4:412, at 65-66, § 4:441, at 89-90, § 4:429, at 79-80;
see also Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, In Defense of Autonomy: An Ethic of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 548 (2008).
123
. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals §§ 6:222, 6:435, in PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 557-58 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797).
124
. See Waldron, supra note 104, at 1110-11.
125
. McCrudden, supra note 111, at 659-60.
126
. See id. at 665.
127
. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 519 (1971).
128
. Id. at 60-61.
129
. Id.
130
. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 24-26 (1996) (discussing the conditions
of moral membership in a political community).
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viewed as the primary moral justifications for all legal rights, and human
dignity is one type of individual human right.131 Most importantly, Dworkin
is perhaps the first American theorist to link human dignity with the U.S.
Constitution,132 viewing equality and dignity as the primary basis for a
moral reading of the American Constitution.133
Traditionally, the contrasting philosophical approach to liberal Kantian
theories has been consequentialism or utilitarianism, which focuses on
promoting overall social welfare rather than an individual’s fundamental
rights. 134 According to consequentialism, certain circumstances justify
violating human dignity if doing so preserves more dignity than the dignity
that was violated. 135 Deterrence-based theories of punishment hold that
rational actions must aim at advancing the overall well-being of society,
which is the only value and social good a society ought to promote, often at
the expense of fairness to the individual.136 Naturally, the notion of human
dignity does not play a significant role under such theories, where society’s
dignity may outweigh an individual’s right to dignity.
Another popular moral theory, communitarian virtue ethics, stands in
sharp contrast both to Kantian views and consequentialist theories.137 The
foundational roots of virtue ethics can be traced to the work of the Greek
philosopher Aristotle,138 who developed the idea that human flourishing
consists in the exercise of certain virtues and is the ultimate goal for all
persons. 139 Virtue ethics emphasizes moral character, in contrast to
deontology, which focuses on duties or rules, and utilitarianism, which

131

.

See id. at 1-38.
See id. at 24, 26.
133
. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-74 (1977).
134
. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Concept of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 208 (2003).
135
. Id. at 208-09.
136
. Id.
137
. See NOEL STEWART, ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 54
(2009); see also PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 8-14 (1978); MARY GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1-17 (1991); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY 239 (1982); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 117 (1982); Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in 13
MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 32, 33 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1988); Sherman J.
Clark, Law as Communitarian Virtue Ethics, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 757 (2005).
138
. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1976) (n.d.);
ROGER CRISP & MICHAEL SLOTE, INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 1, 2 (Roger Crisp &
Michael Slote eds., 1997); see also ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 8 (1999).
139
. See Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue’s Domain, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167, 1168-69
(2009).
132.
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focuses on consequences of action.140 Virtue ethics focuses on what we
should do to be “right” rather than how we should be to be happy.141
Virtue ethics theory is closely linked to the notion of human dignity.
For example, Mary Ann Glendon offers arguments rooted in the importance
of human dignity to justify a policy imperative that addresses injustices
against the poor.142 Until recently, the vast majority of literature on virtue
ethics did not examine the role of community in the construction of
character or the connection between character and law.143 Rather, as a
philosophical moral theory, the natural focus of virtue ethics has been on
personal virtue rather than a virtuous society.144
However, scholars have recently started to identify connections among
virtue ethics, philosophy, and law. 145 While virtue ethics jurisprudence
examines how the law can help make virtuous individuals, it also has
implications for the proper ends of legislation: if the purpose of law is to
make citizens virtuous, how does it affect the content of the laws?146 There
have been several endeavors to apply virtue ethics to the law.147 Kyron
Huigens, for example, has suggested that virtue ethics might provide a way
of thinking about questions of criminal responsibility.148 As well, Huigens
suggests that the purpose of law is “to promote the greater good of
humanity,” and “[t]he criminal law serves that end by promoting virtue . . .
by inquiring into the quality of practical judgment displayed by the accused
in his actions.” 149 What grounds liability is the offender's “faulty
reasoning,” and what the criminal law “condemns” is “not just harm, but
the lack of judgment that results in harm.”150
Some scholars suggest that a commitment to virtue is more compatible
with communitarian approaches than with liberal autonomy-based
140

. See Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 910 (2012).
141
. See Rosalind Hursthouse, Normative Virtue Ethics, in HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE?
19, 20-25 (Roger Crisp ed., 1996) (discussing the basic tenants of virtue ethics).
142
. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 144-46 (2002).
143
. See Clark, supra note 137, at 761-62.
144
. See id.
145
. See Yankah, supra note 139, at 1169.
146
. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of
Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 177, 181 (2003).
147
. See Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and
Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1432-33 (2000); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal
Negligence, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 431 (1998); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 291 (1996).
148
. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 142325 (1995).
149
. Id. at 1425.
150
. Id. at 1424.
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considerations. 151 Sherman Clark, for example, suggests incorporating
virtue ethics theory into law by acknowledging that the central aim of law is
happiness for the people governed by it.152 He further argues that promoting
communitarian character is the route to achieve this well-being.153 As such,
Clark contends that legal discourse ought to examine the connection
between law and public character and the ways in which law plays a role in
the construction of community identity. 154 While communities should
develop character traits in keeping with their own history and culture, there
will be circumstances under which they will need to cultivate other traits
necessary for their well-being.155
Other theorists have argued that virtue ethics is also compatible with
liberalism.156 Martha Nussbaum offers another version of applying a virtuebased theory to the legal context, relying on the concept of human dignity
to develop a theory of social justice, which is based on the concept of
capabilities approach.157 Under Nussbaum’s view, every person possesses
full and equal human dignity—unless in a permanent vegetative condition
or otherwise cut off from striving and sentience.158 A life worthy of human
dignity, Nussbaum contends, requires a minimum of certain central
capabilities.159 She then proposes a list of ten components essential for
minimal social justice, including life, bodily health, and bodily integrity.160
But what does the above philosophical controversy have to do with
human dignity jurisprudence as developed in judicial opinions? The
following section demonstrates that these contrasting philosophical theories
are closely linked to the various ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court
invokes the notion of human dignity.
C. Human Dignity in the U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court has at times conceived both liberty and
communitarian virtue as forms of dignity.161 These different accounts create
151
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a fundamental distinction between using human dignity to promote
individual autonomy and the communitarian account of human dignity as
representing a virtuous society.
D. Liberty as Dignity
In an important line of cases, the Court has invoked the concept of
dignity to promote individualistic approaches, supporting individuals’ rights
to exercise autonomous choices in matters pertaining to their selffulfillment and self-realization. 162 One notable example concerns the
reproductive or abortion cases: the Court first relied on the concept of
liberty as dignity to protect a woman’s autonomous choice to have an
abortion by striking down certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act, in its 1986 decision in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 163 Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun stated that
[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's
decision—with the guidance of her physician and within the limits
specified in Roe—whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make
that choice freely is fundamental.164

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Court broadened its concept of human dignity to embody an individual’s
autonomous choice, self-fulfillment, and self-realization. 165 In the oftquoted “mystery of life” passage, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court,
stated that:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education. Our cases recognize “the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
747 (1986) (overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)) (striking down certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act based on
protecting women’s free choices and the significance of these choices to human dignity),
with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1957) (stating that “[t]he basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man . . . . The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”). While scholars have identified additional concepts of human dignity, this paper
focuses solely on these two.
162
. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
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fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.” Our precedents “have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.” These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.166

While the Court’s concept of human dignity in Thornburgh
encompassed the view that a woman’s right to abortion is as important and
constitutionally protected as other “personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationship, child rearing and
education,” the Casey Court expanded its constitutional protection to
additional autonomous choices central to the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, self-fulfillment, self-realization, and the “mystery of
life.”167
A second line of cases concerns sexual choices, particularly same-sex
relationships, as best illustrated in the Court’s landmark decision in
Lawrence v. Texas.168 Citing the above “mystery of life” passage from
Casey, the Lawrence Court invoked the concept of liberty as dignity to
strike down Texas’s anti-sodomy law as violating the Fourteenth
Amendment’s right to due process,169 stating that “adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons . . . . The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice.”170 Commentators have noted that the Lawrence decision “may
presage a new jurisprudence” that places constitutional limits on a state’s
power to criminalize any activity that is “somehow connected with efforts
to ‘define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life.’”171
Lawrence’s open-ended language may have far-reaching implications:
the Court’s invocation of the concept of liberty as dignity closely follows
Kantian approaches by acknowledging that human dignity is a crucial
feature of human life. Consequently, a broad reading of the Lawrence
holding suggests that under the Fourteenth Amendment, the government
166

. Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (internal citations omitted).
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may not criminalize any conduct that interferes with an individual’s
“choices central to personal dignity,” thereby making any criminal law that
unjustifiably interferes with such choices subject to constitutional scrutiny.
Moreover, the crux of the Lawrence decision is the adoption of the
harm principle, namely, harm to third parties, as the main justification for
exercising the state’s power to limit individuals’ autonomous choices.172
Another direct implication of the Court’s concept of liberty as dignity is its
focus on dignity as an individualistic right, rather than a social one. Most
importantly, it is individual people, as opposed to states, societies or
institutions, who are entitled to enjoy the protection of the fundamental
value of human dignity.
Adopting the concept of liberty as dignity is contingent on the capacity
for making autonomous choices, which excludes young children and
mentally incapacitated individuals, for example. If, in addition, drug addicts
are also deemed not to have the capacity to make autonomous choices to
harm themselves, criminal prohibitions that protect individuals with
impaired capacity from their own harmful choices would need to be upheld
simply because such persons lack the preliminary conditions for exercising
autonomous choices. Moreover, if the Court went even further and
extended its constitutional protection to additional types of autonomous
choices, these could include other forms of exercising one’s right to dignity
and liberty, such as physician-assisted suicide and the use of recreational
drugs.
A broad reading of Lawrence suggests that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the government may not criminalize any conduct that
interferes with individuals’ “choices central to personal dignity.”173 Why,
then, is the Court willing to adopt a liberal approach supporting individuals’
rights to freedom and autonomous choices in matters pertaining to
reproductive and sexual choices, but not in other contexts, such as drugs?
One explanation concerns the harm principle: while reproductive and
sexual choices are inherently harmless to third parties, other personal life
choices, for example, using recreational drugs, are potentially harmful to
others; thus, the latter case justifies criminalization based on a utilitarian
account while the former does not. In addition, reproductive and sexual
choices are a crucial component of self-fulfillment and self-realization,
while the use of recreational drugs is not.174 An argument can be made that
recreational drug use does not implicate fundamental issues where societal
perceptions evolve over time or require the protection of a socially
disadvantaged minority group. In sum, Lawrence’s open-ended “mystery of
172
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life” passage remains an unsolved mystery, as the precise scope and contour
of the Court’s liberty as dignity concept still remains to be seen.
E. Communitarian Virtue as Dignity
A contrasting concept of human dignity invoked by the U.S Supreme
Court is closely related to the philosophical theory of virtue ethics. In a
series of decisions, the Court has invoked the concept of communitarian
virtue as dignity to advance its views on an American society that is
civilized, decent, and virtuous.175 Taken together, these cases suggest that
there are some fundamental standards of decency that command the
government’s protection of the dignity of individuals, and they are best
captured in the notion of communitarian virtue. This line of cases is most
notable in three main contexts: the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, particularly in the death penalty and prisoners’ rights cases;
the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; and its abortion
jurisprudence.176
F. Human Dignity and the Death Penalty
A communitarian virtue account of human dignity is particularly
prominent in the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause. Chief Justice Warren’s 1958 decision in
Trop v. Dulles stressed that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man,” and the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment “draw[s] its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,” emphasizing that these standards embody those that currently
prevail in society.177
While the death penalty is not categorically unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment, the Court significantly confined the types of situations
in which this unique punishment can be imposed. The Court’s limiting
principle states that the death penalty must “be limited to those offenders
who commit “a narrow category of the most serious crimes” and whose
extreme culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution.”178 The
Court applied this limiting principle in a trilogy of Eighth Amendment
cases, in which it held that the death penalty is unconstitutional in cases
involving the mentally retarded,179 juveniles,180 and rapists.181 For juveniles
175
. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1957).
176
. Henry, supra note 27, at 222-23.
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179
. Id.

317

2012]

BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL

318

and the mentally retarded, the Court held that the death penalty violates the
Eighth Amendment because the offender has a diminished personal
responsibility for the crime.182 In cases of rape, the Court relied on the
consensus against imposing the death penalty for child rape and on the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,” which required that the use of the death penalty be restricted to
cases resulting in death.183
The notion of human dignity plays a key role in the Court’s restriction
of the death penalty in these specific categories of cases. In Roper v.
Simmons, Justice Kennedy stressed that human dignity lies at the
foundation of the Eighth Amendment and elevated the value of human
dignity to the level of an intrinsic constitutional value.184 Moreover, he
argued that the Constitution rests upon “innovative principles original to the
American experience, such as . . . specific guarantees for the accused in
criminal cases; and broad provisions to secure individual freedom and
preserve human dignity” and that “[t]hese doctrines and guarantees are
central to the American experience and remain essential to [Americans’]
self-definition and national identity.”185 In Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice
Kennedy stressed that “[e]volving standards of decency must embrace and
express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of
criminals must conform to that rule.”186 In grounding the value of human
dignity as a general constitutional right, along with individual freedom
rights, Justice Kennedy took an important step in the direction of
incorporating the value of human dignity into the Constitution itself,
making it a fundamental value that underlies other constitutional rights,
such as defendants’ criminal procedure guarantees.
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia also emphasizes
the value of human dignity as grounded in the constitutional prohibition of
“cruel and unusual punishment.”187 Justice Brennan notes that the Clause
“prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments.”188 The
State, he adds, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for
their intrinsic worth as human beings; “[a] punishment is ‘cruel and
unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.”189 Brennan
further notes that “the primary principle is that a punishment must not be so
180.
181
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severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings,” and that the
extreme severity of a punishment makes it degrading to the dignity of
human beings beyond the presence of pain, such as punishments that inflict
torture.190
G. Human Dignity and Prisoners’ Rights
In a line of cases involving prisoners’ rights, the U.S. Supreme Court
also relies on the value of human dignity to hold certain prison practices
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. In Hope v. Pelzer, the Court
held unconstitutional a form of punishment that included handcuffing an
inmate to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun without access to a
bathroom.191 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, contends that several
forms of corporal punishment violate the Eighth Amendment and offend
contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity. 192 Citing Chief
Justice Warren’s famous quote from Trop v. Dulles, that the “basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man,”193 Justice Stevens holds that hitching a prisoner to a post for an
extended period of time in a position that was painful, under circumstances
that were both degrading and dangerous, was a way of treatment
“antithetical to human dignity,” and that using such a form of punishment
to discipline a disruptive prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment.194
A recent pronunciation of the Court’s view of human dignity as
embodying the value of communitarian virtue is demonstrated in the 2011
Brown v. Plata decision. The landmark decision stemmed from two class
action lawsuits concerning overcrowded prisons in California: the Plata
class action, alleging unconstitutional failure to provide adequate medical
care, and the Coleman class action, alleging inadequate mental health
care.195 In Coleman v. Schwarzenegger a three-judge court issued a release
order of prisoners over California’s objection; Justice Kennedy
subsequently upheld the order, stressing the pivotal role human dignity
plays in securing the fundamental human rights of inmates.196 He noted that
“prisoners may be deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty, [but
they] retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons . . . [that]
animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
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Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
Id. at 737 (quoting Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974)).
Id. at 738 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
194.
Id. at 745.
195
. See Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law,
90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 610 (2012).
196
. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922 (2011).
191

.
192
.
193
.

319

2012]

BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL

320

punishment.” 197 When a state facility deprives its citizens of basic
sustenance, be it food or medical care, it acts in a manner “incompatible
with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”198
In the Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, involving the
constitutionality of the detention of material witnesses in terrorism
investigations, Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, detailing in
pertinent part:
Ostensibly held only to secure his testimony, al-Kidd was confined in
three different detention centers during his 16 days’ incarceration, kept in
high-security cells lit 24 hours a day, strip-searched and subjected to
body-cavity inspections on more than one occasion, and handcuffed and
shackled about his wrists, legs, and waist.199

Referring to these as “brutal conditions of confinement,” Ginsburg
further stressed that al-Kidd’s ordeal was “a grim reminder of the need to
install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will
control officialdom even in perilous times.”200 Invoking the communitarian
concept of dignity in the “war on terrorism” further strengthens the
Justices’ increasing reliance on this value.
H. Human Dignity and the Fourth Amendment
The U.S. Supreme Court has also invoked human dignity as
communitarian virtue in the context of searches and seizures that
demonstrate a cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which
shocks the conscience. In these cases the searches were particularly
extreme, involving body searches to extract evidence of a crime. The
“shocks the conscience” test was first adopted in the 1957 case of Rochin v.
California, in which the Court held that the forced pumping of a suspect’s
stomach was enough to offend Due Process as conduct that “shocks the
conscience” and violates the “decencies of civilized conduct.” 201 The
significance of the Rochin decision lies in recognizing the individual's
interest in securing his right to human dignity by holding the search and
seizure unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.202
Police conduct that “shocks the conscience” has led to a series of
similar claims by defendants who argued that law enforcement’s search and
seizure practices violated the Due Process Clause based on that
197
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characterization. In Schmerber v. California the Court noted that “[t]he
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.” 203 The Court
further identified a list of factors that create a balancing test between the
individual’s rights to privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity, and the
government’s interest in obtaining evidence.204 Based on this balancing test,
the Court ruled that taking a blood sample from an injured and intoxicated
arrestee over his objection violated neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth
Amendment.205 In contrast, in Winston v. Lee the Court refused to authorize
surgery to remove a bullet from a suspect’s body because it involved “an
‘extensive’ intrusion on respondent’s personal privacy and bodily
integrity,” and the state’s interest in obtaining the bullet was not high
enough to justify such an invasion.206 The extent of intrusion upon the
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity is
therefore an important factor in this balancing test.
I. A Balancing Test: Reconciling Between Contrasting Concepts of Dignity
While the Court has increasingly invoked human dignity in its
constitutional law cases, it has failed to reach a consensus on the
substantive meaning of this value, and has yet to invoke human dignity in
the context of substantive criminal law.207 Similarly, commentators have
neither agreed on the specific content of human dignity in criminal cases
nor have elaborated on what understanding of the notion ought to prevail in
cases where conflicting readings of human dignity may apply. 208 Vera
Bergelson, for example, advocates the use of the notion of human dignity as
an additional component in criminalizing consensual conduct that inflicts
harm to others, suggesting that conducts involving disregard of one’s
dignity should be criminalized only when they are combined with a setback
to interests protected by criminal law.209 Bergelson’s approach, however,
leaves open the question of when, and under what circumstances, do certain
behaviors in fact amount to disregard of an individual’s human dignity.
Moreover, since Bergelson’s proposal rests upon the flawed premise that
the notion of human dignity has only one agreed upon meaning, it does not
address the need to balance between different readings of the notion of
human dignity in cases where conflicting understandings may apply.
203.
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Therefore, this proposal further sharpens the need for developing a
balancing test that would reconcile between potentially conflicting readings
of human dignity.
A close examination of the Court’s human dignity jurisprudence reveals
that while the Court uses contrasting concepts of human dignity in different
categories of cases, it remains unclear what type of balancing test it has
ultimately adopted, and whether the same balancing test applies in all
contexts.
The Abortion Context
Scholars have noted that when the individual concept of dignity as
liberty and autonomy directly conflicts with a communitarian concept, a
clash results in those cases in which societal perceptions strongly condemn
conduct that an individual’s liberty and dignity demand be protected under
the law.210 Judicial decisions have demonstrated that in contentious cases,
the legal enforcement of societal standards and communitarian norms often
outweigh individual free choices.211 These judicial decisions are grounded
in an implicit balancing test adopted by the Court in specific cases,
representing the Court’s view of the proper balance between an individual’s
liberty rights and the societal norms and communitarian demands of a
democratic society.212
The abortion context provides the most notable pronunciation of the
Court explicitly privileging communitarian values over individual liberty
and autonomy. In the its 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was
constitutional.213 Whereas the Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey weighed a woman’s individual right to choose
abortion against the state’s interest in respecting potential human life,214 the
Carhart Court upheld the prohibition, avoiding this balancing test by
categorically privileging a communitarian concept of human dignity, one
that emphasizes a “decent society’s respect for the dignity of human life”
over a woman’s liberty as dignity interests to choose abortion. 215 The
Carhart decision demonstrates clear judicial preference of dignity as
communitarian virtue, trumping the competing concept of liberty and
autonomy as dignity.
While scholars have identified the contrasting concepts of human
dignity invoked by the Court, they have yet to develop a balancing test such
210
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as the one proposed in the remainder of this Article, examining which
values and rights ought to override an individual’s exercise of autonomy. A
broad reading of communitarian virtue as dignity would result in
privileging a host of societal rights and values over individual liberties,
consistent with the Court’s position in Carhart. However, a narrower
reading of communitarian virtue would result in acknowledging only
limited circumstances under which societal values outweigh individual
choices and liberties. In contrast to the Carhart Court’s support for a broad
reading of communitarian virtue as dignity, the alternative approach
advocated here critiques this judicial preference by suggesting that it is
incompatible with the fundamental values and rights underlining the U.S.
Constitution. The following section lays out the guidelines for an
appropriate balance between competing concepts of human dignity.
III. RULES TO LIMIT CRIMINALIZATION OF VICTIMLESS CRIMES
Adopting a balancing test between conflicting concepts of human
dignity requires articulating basic rules to serve as legislative guidelines for
proposals to constrain the scope of certain categories of victimless crimes.
These rules are applicable only in the context of victimless crimes, namely,
after the activity in question is determined to be consensual, inflicting only
harm to self. The principle underlying these rules is that the concept of
human dignity merely supplements, rather than replaces, the harm principle,
which is an essential existing constraint to criminalization. Harm to others
is the paradigmatic example of the rights of others not to be harmed
outweighing an individual’s right to exercise one’s liberties. The harm
principle thus provides the main justification for the state’s restriction on
individual liberty: when a conduct demonstrates a culpable and wrongful
violation of another’s interests, the state is justified in criminalizing this
conduct and imposing proportionate penalties. Put differently, individuals
are entitled to exercise free autonomous choices regarding how to best live
their lives, provided they do not inflict harm on other individuals.
A. Liberty as Dignity Generally Outweighs Communitarian Virtue
Existing prohibitions on victimless crimes are grounded on the premise
that individuals’ consent to harm themselves ought to be legally limited and
that choice-based theory is not a sufficient condition to preclude criminal
liability. 216 Under this prevailing view, the law upholds sanctions for
various types of criminal offenses that inflict harms on consenting
individuals, such as drug activity, gambling, and prostitution
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prohibitions. 217 This approach justifies using the government’s coercive
power to criminalize activities in which consenting adults wish to engage,
even though these activities inflict no harm on others, but only harm to self.
This view, however, fails to grant sufficient protection to one’s right to
liberty as dignity, a right that favors autonomous choices as individuals see
fit.
In contrast to this position, the proposed primary rule is that the concept
of liberty as dignity generally outweighs the concept of dignity as
communitarian virtue. This is the default rule that should apply as a
legislative guideline while considering the constitutionality of any
victimless crime. Moreover, any caveat that would supplement this general
rule by articulating the limited circumstances under which another more
important value outweighs this fundamental rule is only secondary in
importance.
The bold assertion that liberty as dignity generally outweighs the
competing view of communitarian virtue as dignity begs the question: why?
What are the justifications for privileging one concept of dignity over
another? One answer rests with a basic premise underlying a liberal
democratic government: a state needs special justifications to inflict
punishment on individuals because the criminal law infringes on
individuals’ fundamental freedoms and liberty interests and only culpable,
wrongful harms on others trumps the right to enjoy these liberties,
providing good reasons for the state to interfere with those liberties by
imposing criminal penalties. 218 A related consideration supporting the
aforementioned rule is the understanding that criminal law is a stringent
weapon to be used only as a last resort. In other words, an alternative means
of regulation ought to be considered when the objectives of a social policy
may be achieved through methods less violative of individuals’ freedoms
and liberties, and less drastic than the severe criminal sanction.
Furthermore, favoring the concept of liberty as dignity over the
competing concept of communitarian virtue as dignity also requires
rejecting paternalism as a justification for criminalization. The
aforementioned rule adopts John Stuart Mill’s famous articulation of the
harm principle, stating that “the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant.”219
Mill’s statement further sharpens the role of paternalism in
criminalizing consensual conducts, inflicting only harm to self but not to
217
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others. Paternalism is the intervention in an individual’s personal freedoms
aimed at furthering his own good, as opposed to another’s well-being.220
Scholars distinguish “hard” or “strong” from “soft” or “weak” paternalism,
with the latter involving the restriction of an individual’s self-regarding
conduct where the conduct is not substantially voluntary, and the former the
restriction of an individual’s self-regarding conduct where the conduct is
substantially voluntary.221
Legal theorist Joel Feinberg categorically rejects the use of legal
paternalism as a justification for criminalization, arguing that “a person’s
right of self-determination, being sovereign, takes precedence even over his
own good.”222 Feinberg rejects the alternative that “we must balance the
person’s right against his good and weigh them,” contending that
“paternalistic reasons never have any weight on the scales at all.”223 Other
scholars assert that circumstances exist under which the need to protect
individuals from harming themselves outweighs their autonomous freedom
of choice to do so.224 For example, legal theorist R.A. Duff asserts that in
certain circumstances it is legally justified to criminalize conduct that
denies or radically fails to respect the humanity of those against or on
whom they are perpetrated, even if this involves infringing on individuals’
autonomy, and even if such criminalization is not justified under the harm
to others principle. 225 The role of legal paternalism carries practical
implications that go beyond this theoretical debate; recall that current laws
refuse to adopt Mill’s and Feinberg’s categorical rejection of legal
paternalism. As described earlier, existing prohibitions on victimless
conducts essentially rely on paternalistic justifications to uphold crimes that
inflict no direct harm to others.226
The above primary rule generally rejects paternalism as a justification
for criminal prohibitions on victimless crimes. It holds that criminalization
is unwarranted when individuals engage in consensual activities that inflict
no harm on others, because such paternalism imposes majoritarian moral
preferences and prevailing views concerning morality on society at large,
therefore limiting individuals’ liberty to make their own choices about how
best to live their lives.
Another explanation supporting the proposed rule rests with grounding
human dignity as a constitutional right, which is embodied in the U.S.
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Constitution.227 Adopting the paternalistic view that the state is obligated to
intervene and restrict individual free choices in order to promote a
sweeping view of communitarian norms and societal values is deeply
antithetical to American constitutionalism. Arguably, one of the purposes of
the U.S. Constitution is to secure individual personal rights, and human
dignity is indeed such a right. The Declaration of Independence and Bill of
Rights protect individual liberties of free choice on private matters by
providing rights considered to be inviolable. These values and principles
represent the core of the nation’s founding ideology, rejecting excessive
government interference guided by majoritarian views that impose their
moral beliefs on others.228
Scholars have identified a list of constitutional rights enumerated in the
U.S. Constitution.229 These include eight categories of constitutional rights,
which the Supreme Court has invoked and which are part of the Bill of
Rights: Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims; Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claims; Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
claims; Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims; Eighth Amendment
cruel and unusual punishment claims; Fourteenth Amendment right to die
claims; Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims; and First
Amendment freedom of expression claims.230
Privileging values such as liberty, freedom, individualism and
autonomy over advancing societal or communitarian values and rights, the
U.S. Constitution is not simply aimed at promoting communitarian values
and societal interests. Rather, one of its important goals is securing personal
individual rights. Commentators have long suggested that the notion of
human dignity may play a significant part in the context of substantive
criminal law.231 Markus Dubber, for example, argues that the government’s
important role in protecting individual rights suggests an obligation towards
its citizens to refrain from violating their right to human dignity.232 Dubber
further contends that the government is unjustified in criminalizing an
activity that infringes on individuals’ right to engage in behavior they see
fit, provided that they do not harm anyone but themselves.233 Moreover, he
posits that criminal harm is harm to a person, not a community, and that in
light of this individual account of constitutional human rights, conduct that
227
. See Dworkin, supra note 109, at 24, 26; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR
HEDGEHOGS 191-218, 255-75 (2011).
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Autonomy, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 136 (2006).
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qualifies as harmless cannot be criminalized in a constitutional regime of
criminal law.234
While privileging individual freedoms is typically associated with a
Kantian liberal account, it is not necessarily inconsistent with a
communitarian virtue account. Indeed, the pursuit of liberty, freedom,
privacy and autonomy are fundamental American values, and the promise
of “liberty and justice for all,” embodied in the Constitution, ought to result
in privileging the right to consent to harming oneself.235
Second, privileging the concept of liberty as dignity is justified on the
grounds that it secures a negative right, while the competing concept of
communitarian virtue as dignity promotes positive rights, which are
generally foreign to the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the vast majority of
rights enumerated in the Constitution are viewed as negative.236 A negative
approach to human dignity requires the state to refrain from interfering
with individuals’ exercise of their liberties and freedoms as long as
individuals do not inflict harm on others by violating their interests.237 A
constitutional regime grounded in a negative rights approach embraces a
non-interference norm as the rule, requiring the government to abstain from
intervening in individuals’ autonomy concerning their life choices (as
opposed to requiring the government to intervene in promoting their wellbeing).238
In a recent empirical study, David Law and Mila Versteeg examined
the globalization of constitutional law and compared constitutions around
the world. The study identified several types of rights; the first list consists
of “first-generation,” negative, civil/political rights.239 These include the
right to life; the prohibitions of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention;
freedom of movement; the right not to be expelled; Habeas corpus; the
presumption of innocence; the right to appeal; the prohibition of ex post
facto laws; the rights to public trial, to remain silent, to counsel, and to
judicial review; and the prohibition of the death penalty.240 A second list
consists of “second-generation,” positive, socioeconomic rights, including
rights such as workers’ rights, rights to basic physical needs, the right to
adequate standard of living, and rights to food, housing, water, health and
education.241 A third list consists of “third-generation,” community/group
234.
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rights, such as rights for the elderly and handicapped, women’s rights, and
rights for the family, children, victims of crimes, and prisoners.242
Law and Versteeg suggest that constitutions can be divided across
ideological lines. Some are characterized as libertarian, with a focus on
limiting the government’s ability to deprive individuals of their physical
freedom or to inflict bodily harm.243 This goal is achieved mainly through
enshrining the judicial system with extensive authority to protect
individuals’ liberties and freedoms. 244 Such constitutions represent a
common law tradition of negative liberty and are grounded in some form of
negative restriction on government power, creating a space of private
autonomy and liberty with which the government may not interfere.245
In sharp contrast, Law and Versteeg argue that the second type of
constitutions is statist in nature, providing the state with a broad range of
powers and positive responsibilities.246 These constitutions empower, or
even obligate, the government to provide for the welfare of its citizens,
adopting a far more active role for the state. Law and Versteeg further argue
that while libertarian constitutions are premised on the goal of protecting
individual liberties and freedoms against the tyranny of government, they
rest on the premise that the government’s role is promoting the welfare of
society as a whole.247 The comparative analysis also found that liberal
constitutions are characteristic of democratic regimes with a common law
tradition, while statist constitutions typically characterize undemocratic
regimes with a civil law tradition.248 Such analysis further confirms that the
U.S. Constitution represents the classical liberal Constitution, one that
adopts negative restriction on state power, focusing on limiting or
preventing actions against the individual by the state.249
The above study supports the proposition that the concept of liberty as
dignity should generally outweigh the competing concept of communitarian
virtue as dignity. As a libertarian constitution, the U.S. Constitution
explicitly privileges a negative approach that favors a non-interference duty
on the government.250 Viewed through this lens, the U.S. Constitution is
therefore more compatible with the concept of liberty and autonomy as
dignity than with the contrasting view of communitarian virtue as dignity.
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B. Circumstances Where Communitarian Virtue Prevails
Adopting a position that individuals are free to harm themselves under
all circumstances is an unwarranted and overbroad legal change. Since no
rule is absolute, clear boundaries must be set between individuals’ right to
harm themselves and the state’s interest in limiting this right to promote
fundamental societal values. The above primary rule, which rejects a “hard”
form of communitarian virtue as dignity, leaves open the question of
whether there ought to be some narrowly defined circumstances in which
some “weaker” form of communitarian virtue as dignity outweighs
individuals’ autonomous choices to engage in activities that harm
themselves.
The proposed secondary rule advocates a more nuanced account of
communitarian values, one that recognizes the autonomous right of
individuals to engage in consensual activities that may harm themselves,
while at the same time adopting a legal boundary to limit such a choice
where specific forms of risk are identified. This approach recognizes that
there are competing values that directly clash with individuals’ right to
enjoy fundamental liberties and exercise autonomous choices. It further
recognizes that these competing values ought to be weighed and properly
balanced against each other in specific categories of cases. This balancing
act results in acknowledging that in certain circumstances, the law ought to
intervene by placing some constraints on the lives of individuals whose
choices might endanger their other fundamental rights.
A balancing test that weighs individuals’ liberty rights against
competing societal interests is a common component in many foreign
constitutional schemes. 251 Constitutional balance typically adopts a
proportionality review in which the main mechanism is a means-end
analysis.252 For example, the Canadian balancing test provides that:
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on
irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the
objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective
in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom
in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of
the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or
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freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient
importance.”253

The law must define under what narrow circumstances the right to
autonomy and liberty should be balanced against competing fundamental
rights. The circumstances under which communitarian virtue as dignity
outweighs liberty as dignity include two types. The first type embodies
situations in which the fundamental premise underlying the right to choose
freely is absent, namely, when individuals lack the capacity for making free
choices. These individuals mainly include minors and others whose
capacity to choose is significantly impaired due to a physical or mental
condition.254 The second type includes activities that significantly endanger
inalienable rights, namely, the right to life and to bodily integrity, including
protection against serious life-threatening or permanent injuries.255
C. Impaired Capacity to Exercise Autonomy
One type of circumstance that justifies limiting individuals’ liberty is
impaired capacity to exercise autonomous choices.256 Indeed, a prerequisite
for exercising the right to liberty is the capacity to enjoy it. Recall that the
Kantian ideas of liberty and dignity hold that individuals have the right to
direct their own lives and a duty to respect others by not interfering with
their choices.257 However, this vision is premised on the assumption that all
individuals are free, equal, self-governing agents who make free choices
and have the full capacity to do so.258
In the case of children or incompetent individuals, however, the entire
justification for this broad view of autonomy collapses. Those individuals
with diminished capacities need the law’s protection from making choices
that would harm them. 259 While the purpose of liberalism is to allow
individuals to exercise their moral and rational powers, it also requires that
they possess those powers to some minimum degree.260
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What, then, should the standard be for determining that specific
individuals have impaired or diminished capacities to harm themselves?
The answer depends on how broadly diminished capacity is defined, and on
the stringency of the requirements for determining lack of capacity. In cases
of drug addiction, it is unclear whether such addiction qualifies as a
condition that completely deprives addicts of the capacity to exercise
autonomous choices.261 The Article revisits this question in Section IV.
C. Endangering the Right to Life
Another circumstance which warrants communitarian virtue as dignity
outweighing liberty as dignity concerns activities that pose significant risks
to life and bodily integrity. The right to life is one of the most fundamental
constitutional rights, grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.262
While negative rights, such as criminal procedure rights, require the
government to refrain from taking certain forms of actions, the right to life
and bodily integrity requires the government and its citizens both to refrain
from taking actions that would significantly endanger one’s inalienable
right to life and bodily integrity and to take affirmative actions to ensure
that this right is properly secured.
While the right to life is one of the most basic human rights, invoking it
in American jurisprudence is often associated with the controversy over
abortion,263 a rhetorical link that obfuscates the centrality of the latter as a
fundamental general human right, irrespective and independent of the
abortion context. Furthermore, this link often results in failing to consider
the general implications of the right to life in other contexts, such as the
criminal law. One notable example of the significance of the right to life is
found in the context of international law, where this right is considered
fundamental. 264 Numerous international documents, declarations, and
treaties state that every person has an inalienable right to life, liberty, and
privacy, which are crucial components of happiness and well-being.265
The following discussion adopts the position that the right to life is a
fundamental human right.266 The importance of the right to life makes it the
261.
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focal point of the proposed rule under which activities that significantly
endanger the right to life and bodily integrity ought to remain criminally
prohibited, even when engaged in by consenting individuals. The proposed
balancing test requires privileging the state’s need to protect the right to life
and bodily integrity over the competing value of liberty and dignity rights
to exercise autonomous choices, thus drawing a reasonable boundary
between justified and unjustified criminalization. While the primary rule
prohibits the state from criminalizing consensual activities that would
violate liberty and dignity rights, the secondary rule allows for only those
activities that put the right to life or bodily integrity in significant danger to
be criminalized.
In light of this narrow caveat to the general right to liberty and
autonomy, the proposed rule passes the proportionality review noted earlier.
Indeed, the continued criminalization of life threatening activities is
designed to secure the right to life and bodily integrity. Since
criminalization is confined only to activities that risk this right, the rules
preserve the right to liberty and offer a proportionality between the effects
of criminalization and the fundamental right to life. Moreover, the
government’s requirement to protect the right to life and bodily integrity
relies on a “softer” or “weaker” version of communitarian virtue as dignity.
As every civilized society cherishes the value of human life, it is required to
uphold it. This rationale provides the justification for society’s coercive
intervention, in the form of criminal regulation, to prevent individuals from
engaging in dangerous activities that risk the right to life and bodily
integrity.
D. Distinguishing Between Different Types of Dangerous Activities
One potential critique of the proposed rules is that they are unable to
draw clear conceptual boundaries between illegal and permissible types of
activities that endanger the right to life and bodily integrity. Given the
range of risky activities, which endanger lives but are perfectly legal, why
should the law selectively criminalize certain of these activities while
allowing other equally dangerous ones?
Answering this question rests on capturing the fundamental differences
between permissible and criminally risky activities. One possible
distinction is that prohibited activities are more dangerous than their legal

abortion context, specifically concerning the question of whether a fetus is considered a
“person” under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Article focuses solely on the implications
of human dignity jurisprudence in the context of consensual activities between adults,
addressing the constitutional right to life only as it pertains to existing criminal prohibitions
on victimless crimes.
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counterparts.267 Under this reasoning, the principle of autonomy protects the
right to engage in dangerous activities unless the risk exceeds a certain
threshold, at which point the protection afforded by the principle of
autonomy is outweighed by the need to prevent individuals from harming
themselves.268 Take, for example, the ancient practice of gladiators fighting
to the death. The main purpose of the game—killing the opponent—is what
justifies the prohibition on such fights. In contrast, while harm is also likely
to occur in sports such as boxing, harm is simply incidental to the game,
which accounts for its legality. One drawback to this distinction is that it
requires the adoption of a test to determine how to define this threshold of
risk as well as which risky activities exceed that threshold.
Another factor that distinguishes between different types of dangerous
activities is the relative importance of the activity in question.269 Ostensibly,
important risky activities deserve the protection of autonomy while
unimportant ones do not. For example, engaging in competitive sports is
significant to peoples’ lives, and thus ought to be protected by autonomy,
even if it carries some risks to the players. Another related factor is that
legal activities cause a net balance of utility, whereas prohibited activities
do not.270 Claiming that the benefits of engaging in competitive sports
outweigh the risks to the players is not an objective determination but one
that requires a normative evaluation, which is contingent on non-neutral
moral judgments about societal values. While boxing, football and other
risky sports pose significant risks to human life and bodily integrity, they
are nonetheless highly regulated activities, which are performed in closelysupervised environments under strict rules and regulations. In contrast,
illegal dangerous activities, such as using recreational drugs, are performed
in unsupervised, unregulated private settings, which make alternative forms
of regulation impossible. Therefore, engaging in life-threatening activities
in unregulated settings justifies the state’s criminal regulation of these
activities to secure the fundamental right life and bodily integrity.
E. Constitutional Implications
Recall that currently, substantive criminal law survives constitutional
scrutiny. 271 While courts apply the strict scrutiny test to evaluate the
constitutionality of laws implicating fundamental rights such as free speech,
criminal prohibitions are perceived as implicating only non-fundamental
rights; therefore, courts assess their constitutionality under the rational basis
267
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test under which the state only needs to show a conceivable legitimate
purpose to enact the law in question, allowing most criminal prohibitions to
pass constitutional scrutiny.272
Several scholars have suggested that individuals have a constitutional
right against excessive punishment. Douglas Husak, for example, suggests
that all criminal prohibitions implicate the fundamental right not to be
punished, and that all criminal laws ought to be assessed against the
intermediate scrutiny standard of judicial review. 273 Under Husak’s
proposal, the state must show that the law in question aims at a substantial
state interest, directly advances that interest, and is no more extensive than
necessary to achieve this objective. 274 While subjecting all criminal
prohibitions to the intermediate level of judicial scrutiny may be viewed as
a welcome direction in limiting the scope of criminalization, it defines the
right in question—a general right not to be punished—too broadly, making
the proposal too radical.
In contrast, the aforementioned rules define the right in question more
narrowly, applying the proposal only in the limited context of victimless
crimes, thus arguably making the application of the heightened standard of
judicial review potentially less objectionable. The proposal’s key idea is to
base the right to engage in consensual conducts that do not inflict harm on
third parties on the right to dignity as liberty and autonomy. Conceding that
the right to dignity is a fundamental right ought to result in subjecting all
criminal prohibitions that limit this right to a heightened standard of judicial
review rather than to the current deferential rational basis test.
To survive the more stringent intermediate standard of judicial review,
the state would need to demonstrate that criminal prohibitions on victimless
crimes are aimed at substantial state interests, that they advance those
interests, and that criminalization is not more extensive than necessary to
achieve the substantial state interest. 275 Balancing between individuals’
right to liberty as dignity and the competing state interest to criminalize
behaviors inflicting only harm to self would result in striking down criminal
prohibitions in those categories of cases that do not significantly endanger
individuals’ right to life or bodily integrity.
IV. APPLYING THE PROPOSAL TO RECREATIONAL DRUG PROHIBITIONS
The following section focuses on one notable implication of the above
theory by applying the proposed rules to recreational drug prohibitions.
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A. Why Drug Crimes?
Why should a proposal to limit the scope of victimless crimes
specifically aim at drug crimes rather than at other types of victimless
crimes such as prostitution or gambling? Scholars criticizing the problem of
overcriminalization in general, and the unjustified criminalization of
victimless crimes in particular, often provide examples of obsolete criminal
statutes, which demonstrate remnants of legal moralism that are
unwarranted in a post-Lawrence era.276 Sara Sun Beale, for example, notes
that despite the contemporary approach that sexual morality ought to
remain beyond the scope of criminal regulation, a large number of states
still criminalize fornication and adultery, and most states criminalize
prostitution.277 However, these offenses are rarely enforced and represent a
miniscule percentage of cases that reach the criminal justice system.278
In sharp contrast, the most notable victimless offenses—drug crimes—
account for an enormous number of criminal convictions and incarcerated
individuals in the country’s overcrowded prisons.279 Furthermore, the use of
“soft” drugs such as marijuana is prevalent among many Americans,
turning all users into potential criminals.280 According to estimates, while
over 700,000 people are arrested every year for marijuana possession, over
100 million Americans actually use the drug.281 This is a troubling finding,
given that the prevalence of drug use increasingly expands the coercive
powers and authorities of the government, in excess to measures used
outside the drugs context.282 In practical terms, this expansion means more
stops and arrests, more invasions of privacy in the form of home searches,
and more intrusive bodily searches and pat downs.283 Scholars contend that
the expansive “war on drugs” has resulted in “drugs exceptionalism”, under
which the enforcement of drug crimes often precludes the protection of the
same defendants’ rights regularly granted to other offenders.284 Moreover,
drug laws carry a notably disparate impact on racial and national minorities,
groups who are most affected by the continued criminalization of drugs.285
In light of this reality, focusing on recreational drug prohibitions as
paradigmatic examples of victimless crime rests on the premise that a
change in substantive drug laws would have a dramatic impact on the
276
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criminal justice system, including significant decreases both in criminal
convictions as well as in the country’s prison population. The following
discussion argues that applying the proposed rules in the drug context
would have the greatest effect on the criminal justice system by
significantly limiting criminalization.
B. A Consequentialist Critique of Drug Prohibition
The increasing dissatisfaction of scholars, policy makers, and the public
at large with the government’s continuous “war on drugs” in the last forty
years has resulted in voluminous writings concerning the numerous
drawbacks in criminalizing the use and possession of recreational drugs,
mainly marijuana. 286 However, the focus of this growing critique is
typically not grounded in libertarian theories concerning individuals’ rights
and autonomous choices to use recreational drugs, but rather in the
dominant paradigms of consequentialist accounts of drug prohibitions,
namely, in a cost/benefit analysis as the main justification for
decriminalizing drug use and possession.287
While the prohibition against the recreational use of drugs has
historically been linked to moral reprobation, infused with racial and ethnic
overtones, the most prevalent arguments raised today against drug
prohibitions rest on the utilitarian law and economic critique.288 Arguably,
in sharp contrast to other areas involving victimless crimes, such as the
criminal regulation of sexual practices including same-sex sexual
relationships, where normative, rights-based claims have been made to
reject criminal bans on private consensual conducts, much less focus has
been devoted to such arguments in the context of drug laws.
In light of the prevalence of utilitarian harm arguments in American
jurisprudence, modern proponents of the continued criminalization of
recreational drugs do not ground their support for drug prohibitions on
moral justifications. 289 Instead, they rely on harm-based arguments to
advocate a blanket prohibition of all types of drugs.290 The common reasons
286.
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used to justify such a prohibition include the harmful impact of drugs on
one’s health,291 the need to protect children from the harmful effects of
drugs,292 the prevalence of drug-related crimes, and the argument that “soft”
drugs lead to “hard” ones. 293 Moreover, to strengthen their position,
proponents of prohibition advance economic-based justifications to
criminalize drug use, contending that it places heavy burdens and financial
costs on society.294
Opponents contend that scientific evidence raises significant doubts
regarding the harms of soft drugs, such as marijuana.295 As well, legal
drugs—predominantly alcohol—can be more harmful than marijuana and
yet are not criminalized.296 Furthermore, some soft drug use is thought to be
less dangerous than a wide array of other harmful but legal activities, such
as contact sports.297 Critics also reject the asserted link between drugs and
crime, contending that the amount of systemic crime would be reduced by
decriminalization; that many economic crimes are caused not by drugs
themselves but by drug prohibitions; that criminalization is not an effective
way to reduce economic crimes; and that research does not support the
claim that drug use encourages violent behavior.298
C. Deontological Critique of Drug Prohibition
In their focus on the enormous financial costs that the “war on drugs”
put on the criminal justice system, scholars criticizing drug prohibition
sometimes fail to fully consider a normative rights-based perspective.299
Political and philosophical theorists, however, contend that drug laws are
inherently suspect from a liberal perspective: in a free society, individuals
should be allowed to make their own choices about using harmful
substances without government intervention, and the onus is placed on the
government to justify the interference with this personal liberty.300
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Joel Feinberg, David A.J. Richards, Douglas Husak and Michael Moore
are among the most prominent theorists advocating for the
decriminalization of drugs, based on the theory that liberalism is committed
to protecting individuals’ rights to use recreational drugs.301 These liberal
theorists and others contend that in light of ample scientific doubts
regarding the harmful effects of drugs, the presumption of freedom ought to
prevail since the evidentiary burden of proof lies with the state.302
In his landmark book, David A.J. Richards contends that a liberal-based
criminal justice system is premised on an autonomy-based concept,
requiring the state to respect individuals’ ability to determine the meaning
of their lives.303 Richards argues that one’s right to autonomous choice
requires that the state refrain from criminalizing drug use as a means to
enforce some choices over others. 304 Douglas Husak advocates for the
decriminalization of all types of drug use and possession. He reframes the
core question in the debate as to whether the use of a given drug should be
criminalized, rather than whether drug use should be decriminalized.305
Moreover, Husak contends that no good argument in favor of criminalizing
drug use has yet been made to justify criminalization.306
Michael Moore further provides a strong argument against the
criminalization of taking recreational drugs based on individuals’ right to
liberty. He contends that a legislator may criminalize only that which he
may condemn as morally wrong, and generally speaking, there is no breach
of any moral obligation in taking recreational drugs. 307 Moore further
argues that since criminalization demands punishment, those who do no
wrong cannot be punished, therefore drug taking, as a self-defining choice,
should be protected by the basic right to liberty.308
While these types of arguments are well known, they have not taken
hold among legislatures, which has consequently resulted in a failure to
promote fundamental changes in existing drug laws.309 Moreover, despite a
301
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to his objection to criminalizing recreational drug taking: the obligation not to commit moral
suicide, which translates into the obligation not to take drugs regularly enough that people
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growing trend showing increasing support for the decriminalization of
marijuana, 310 arguably no comprehensive change has occurred yet in
societal attitudes toward drug use in general—and marijuana use in
particular—as significant parts of the public continue to support criminal
prohibitions on all types of drugs, including marijuana.311
D. Applying the Proposed Rules
One reason that may account for the failure to promote fundamental
change in American drug laws is the lack of a theoretical agreement among
different communities about the appropriate legal line to draw between
different types of recreational drugs. This view further suggests that the
criminal law ought to consider a middle ground between individuals’ liberty
rights and fundamental societal values and interests. This middle ground
may require some points of agreement among competing philosophical
theories. Ekow Yankah, for example, contends that the decriminalization of
marijuana is practically possible because advocates of decriminalization can
theoretically agree on a philosophical starting point, ideally resulting in
consensus between liberals and non-liberals. 312 For liberals, the
criminalization of marijuana is unjustified because it interferes with one’s
freedom and autonomy.313 For virtue-based theorists, the criminalization of
marijuana is unjustified because it results in diminishing society’s wellbeing, therefore weakening, rather than fostering a virtuous society.314
The following section carves out clear distinctions between different
types of drugs and different types of drug-related activities. A main feature
of current drug laws is their all-encompassing prohibition, a position that
fails to appreciate the sharp distinctions between fundamentally distinct
types of drugs based on their varying effects. Recall that under current drug
laws, offenders are incarcerated for possession and use of all types of drugs,
including marijuana.315 While a growing number of states allow personal
use of marijuana with a doctor’s recommendation, and many local
jurisdictions have relaxed their penalties for marijuana use and possession
of small amounts of this drug, the complete decriminalization of marijuana
310
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has not taken place at the federal level, and only two states currently
legalize the possession, for recreational purposes, of less than one ounce of
marijuana.316
1. Distinguishing “Soft” Drugs from “Hard” Drugs
The distinction between different types of drugs in American drug laws
rests on classifying all drugs into five schedules, depending on the
combination of three factors: their medicinal value, potential for abuse and
psychological and physical effects.317 This classification does not recognize
a distinction between “soft” and “hard” drugs. For example, the Controlled
Substances Act places both marijuana and heroin under Schedule I, the
most severely restricted category, as drugs that have a high potential for
abuse and no recognized medical use, while cocaine is designated as a
Schedule II substance.318
Commentators have long criticized the Controlled Substances Act’s
classification method 319 : William Stuntz, for example, has suggested a
distinction between “serious” and “less serious” drug offenses, based not
only on the nature of the crime—distribution versus possession—but also
by the seriousness of the drug itself, which means distinguishing marijuana
and similarly ‘soft’ drugs from ‘hard’ drugs like cocaine or heroin. 320
However, such proposals for alternative methods of distinguishing between
different types of drugs based on their relative harmful effects have
generally failed to take hold among legislatures and, more specifically,
Congress has rejected proposals to reschedule marijuana.321
In contrast with American drug laws, foreign countries such as the
Netherlands differentiate between drugs based on their potential harm.322
The proposed rules advocate this distinction, under which “soft” drugs
include all products of the cannabis plant, including not only marijuana but
316
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States and in the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 339-48 (2010); see also In the
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Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1433 (2009).
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also hashish, while “hard” drugs include heroin, cocaine, amphetamines,
and other chemically produced recreational drugs.
The above line-drawing is based on the fundamental distinction
between decriminalization of recreational drugs and their legalization.323
Decriminalization entails abolishing criminal prohibitions on using and
possessing recreational drugs. 324 Legalization, however, involves not
merely lifting prohibitory bans on drug use but also abolishing the
prohibitions on the production and sale of drugs.325 Given this distinction,
the proposed rules advocate only the decriminalization of victimless crimes
but not their legalization, therefore excluding drug trafficking from their
scope.
Moreover, the proposed rules are based on individuals’ rights to liberty,
autonomy and dignity. Freely exercising these rights, which is this Article’s
main focus, is unrelated to drug trafficking because criminal prohibitions on
producing and selling drugs do not violate individuals’ autonomous choices
to use them. Also, proposals to legalize the production and sale of
recreational drugs are based on utilitarian arguments, mainly focusing on
the economic gains which legalization would provide in the form of tax
revenues. To the contrary, the proposed rules do not advocate for
decriminalization based on economics, but instead for advancing a more
just criminal justice system by drawing on the value of human dignity.326
2. Decriminalizing “Soft” Drugs
A key issue concerning the decriminalization of use and possession of
“soft” drugs, based on the concept of liberty as dignity, concerns the
question of addiction. Addiction and substance abuse undercut the
justification behind decriminalization; drug addicts do not exercise
autonomous choices when using drugs, because the addiction effectively
controls their lives.327 Scientific evidence, however, shows that “soft” drugs
are not physically addictive, debunking the claim that “soft” drugs impair
one’s capacity to exercise autonomous choices and advancing the case for
decriminalization. 328 Put differently, the limited caveat supporting the
government’s obligation to secure individuals’ right to life or bodily
integrity is not demonstrated in the case of use of “soft” drugs.
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3. Continued Criminalization of “Hard” Drugs
Advocating for the full decriminalization of use and possession of all
types of drugs presents a challenge in light of two factors characterizing
“hard” drugs: the significant harms and injuries incurred by users, and the
addiction element. Recall that the secondary proposed rule, serving as a
limiting caveat to the primary one, advocates for the continued
criminalization of victimless crimes only when certain activities are
exercised by individuals whose capacity to make autonomous choices is
impaired or when the activities in question significantly endanger the right
to life or bodily integrity. “Hard” drugs present the paradigmatic case where
these two features are present, which justifies the application of the
caveat—they are both extremely dangerous, significantly putting
individuals’ right to life at risk, and highly addictive, thus undermining the
justification of protecting individuals’ autonomous choices.
The abuse of “hard” drugs not only poses health risks, but also creates a
significant risk of death. For example, injecting heroin is a particularly
common route of administration among heroin users, and can contribute to
the clogging of the blood vessels that lead to the lungs, liver, kidneys, and
brain. 329 Moreover, repeated intravenous injections can cause vascular
sclerosis and lead the injectors to inject subcutaneously or intramuscularly,
resulting in a series of infections, which may become lethal.330 HIV and
other types of infections, such as hepatitis, along with depression of the
immune system, are also serious concerns among injection drug users.331 As
well, cocaine use presents significant health issues; the cardiovascular
system is the system most often adversely affected by cocaine, which
increases the risk of coronary artery disease.332 Studies suggest that cocaine
users may often die suddenly as a result of having varying lethal doses of
the substance in their systems.333 While these medical complications may
vary depending on the individual, frequency of use, amount of dosage, and
prior medical attributes, it is clear that abuse of many “hard” drugs
significantly endangers individuals’ lives, therefore justifying their
continued criminalization.
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The significant risks of addiction associated with “hard” but not “soft”
drugs are another factor supporting the proposed distinction between the
two, thus explaining why only criminalization of the former is justified. The
implications of the addiction factor are twofold: highly addictive drugs pose
risks to bodily integrity and increase the likelihood of drug abuse and
overdose, further supporting their continued criminalization. Moreover, in
contrast with other risky activities, such as contact sports, recreational drug
use is not supervised or regulated through alternative and less intrusive
means. One of the notable drawbacks in criminalizing all types of drugs is
that except for cases involving proscribed drugs for medicinal purposes, the
state cannot effectively regulate or supervise drug use.334
Liberal theorists have struggled with the question of whether choosing
a life of regular drug use can qualify as a self-defining choice.335 Legal
theorist Michael Moore, for example, contends that recreational drug use
ought to be protected by the right to liberty, while a life of total addiction
conflicts with one’s rationality and autonomy.336 Samuel Freeman agrees,
suggesting that liberalism would permit regulation of only those drugs that
“permanently or indefinitely impair our capacities for rational and moral
agency.” 337 The question of prohibition, then, depends on whether a
particular drug is so addictive as to deprive individuals of their abilities to
make free autonomous choices.
E. Constitutionality under the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard
Recall that the proposed rules are based on the premise that victimless
crimes implicate the fundamental right to dignity and therefore ought to be
subjected to heightened constitutional scrutiny. 338 While current drug
prohibitions survive constitutional scrutiny under the deferential rational
basis review, they are likely to fail to meet the requirements of the more
stringent intermediate judicial review standard.339 In a post-Lawrence era,
where demonstrating the presence of harm to others is a predicate for
criminal prohibitions, states will have a hard time demonstrating that
criminalizing the use of “soft” drugs serves a substantial state interest, that
the prohibition advances this interest, and that criminalization is not too
excessive to accomplish it.
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Under the “substantial state interest” requirement, a state would need to
demonstrate that the prohibition of the use of “soft” drugs is designed to
reduce a substantial risk and the likelihood of ultimate harm—a
requirement that would be hard to meet given the current scientific research
indicating that “soft” drugs are not addictive and do not lead to death or
other bodily injury. 340 In contrast, even under the intermediate judicial
scrutiny standard, the continued criminalization of “hard” drugs will likely
survive constitutional scrutiny because states will be able to demonstrate a
significant interest in upholding these criminal prohibitions, and
consequently reducing substantial risks and the likelihood of ultimate harm.
“Hard” drugs are addictive, increase the likelihood of abuse and
overdose, and inflict significant health risks on users, thus justifying
criminalization as a means to preserve individuals’ rights to life and bodily
integrity. Furthermore, the harms of “hard” drugs extend to others because
many users resort to criminal activities to feed their habit.341 Moreover, the
risks of “hard” drugs often involve children, who are often neglected by
their addicted parent(s).342 These state interests, in addition to the deterrent
effect of criminalization, are sufficiently significant to justify prohibitions
on “hard’ drugs. Finally, in light of the substantial risks that “hard” drugs
pose, criminal prohibitions are not an excessive measure to reduce the
likelihood of these risks.
CONCLUSION
While scholars disagree about the legal means that should be employed
to accomplish change, few dispute the urgent need for change in the
criminal justice system. In light of this reality, the time is ripe for revisiting
both substantive criminal law’s “hands-off” approach to adopting
constitutional constraints on criminal statutes, as well as for reconsidering
the role that substantive criminal law may play in limiting the scope of
criminalization.
This Article has proposed one mechanism to limit overcriminalization
of victimless crimes, particularly drug crimes, by using the notion of human
dignity as a constitutional constraint on criminalization. It has demonstrated
that the law needs to adopt a balancing test to reconcile conflicting
understandings of human dignity and that, in light of the key role that
liberty plays in American jurisprudence, the concept of liberty as dignity
ought to outweigh the competing interest of communitarian virtue as
dignity. The proposed rule requires that the state not interfere with
individuals’ autonomous free choices regarding how to best live their lives.
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Favoring this concept of dignity further requires the state to decriminalize
consensual conducts between adults, even if they inflict harm upon the
participants, provided that they are harmless to third parties.
Conceding that no rule is absolute, the Article has identified the limited
circumstances under which communitarian virtue as dignity may outweigh
individuals’ liberty interests, requiring the continued criminalization of
consensual activities that pose significant risks to individuals, because the
key right to life outweighs individuals’ liberty interests in engaging in
potentially fatal activities. Adopting such a balancing test should pass
constitutional muster under the intermediate scrutiny standard.
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